An Empirical Study about Ownership Structure on Agency Cost for National Commercial Bank
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DOI: 10.25236/busem.2017.04
Corresponding Author
Xu Huimin
Abstract
With the opening of China's financial market, China's banking industry begins to face competition from the world, which requires China's reform and modernization of commercial banks. Agency costs are the core of corporate governance, and it is an important factor for directly restricting governance performance of our commercial bank. The agency problems of commercial banks are particularly complex, including the agency problems between shareholders and managers, between government and government, between shareholders and creditors, between the large shareholders and minority shareholders. The ownership structure of China's commercial banks will produce a variety of interest conflicts, which led to agency costs, so the ownership structure has an important impact on the contractual relationships between shareholders, managers and creditors, optimizing the ownership structure are an effective way to solve the principal-agent problem of the banking industry.
Keywords
National Commercial Bank Ownership Structure Agency Cost.