Company Performance, CEO Legal Background, and Auditor Independence
Download as PDF
DOI: 10.25236/icssem.2025.078
Author(s)
Yuzhou Su, Jinyuan Zhang
Corresponding Author
Jinyuan Zhang
Abstract
In this study, we examined how CEOs with a legal background influence auditor independence and corporate performance, drawing insights from the Evergrande and PwC auditing cases. We employed empirical methods, explored whether legal expertise among executives enhances audit quality and strengthens corporate governance. Through three distinct model analyses, our findings indicate that CEOs with legal training may promote greater auditor independence, while elevated audit fees often signal higher corporate risk or operational complexity. These results contribute to a deeper understanding of the interplay between executive background characteristics, audit integrity, and firm performance, offering valuable implications for both academia and corporate governance practices.
Keywords
Legal Background, Auditor Independence, Corporate Performance, Corporate Governance